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Recent Decisions
•.. would require us to hold that whenever a non-profit institution
made a charge for its care or services to any resident or patient, the
institution would be precluded from obtaining tax exemption. Con-
sequently, hospitals which charge large sums for care of and services
to paying patients, and colleges and universities which charge
tuition to countless students, would not be entitled to real estate
tax exemption. This interpretation and result is not required by
the language or spirit of the Constitution of Pennsylvania... 46
Although the cost of operating these institutions has caused increased
rates for those who can afford to pay, they are by their very nature
charitable and deserve the tax immunity.
When exempting an institution from a tax the exemption includes
certain activities which are conducted as incidental to its main
charitable purpose, and on which it receives an immediate profit
over and above their cost which are used to reduce the deficit
incurred by its general charitable work, this is still a charity in the
truest sense. 47
The community has the burden to care for charitable patients. To
increase the expenditures of these charitable institutions by levying
taxes on their gross receipts will result in higher charges or less efficient
service to the community.
Ronald M. Stein
CRIMINAL LAW-HOMICIDE-SELF-DEFENSE-THE DUTY TO RETREAT-
The Pennsylvania Supreme Court extended the no-retreat dwelling
house exception to the self-defense rule by holding that a person in his
place of business may lawfully resist an intruder with the use of deadly
force even though a way of escape is available.
Commonwealth v. Johnston, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970).
Commonwealth v. Johnston' is an innovative decision which limits
the duty to retreat in cases of self-defense. The facts of the case are
46. Id. at 154.
47. Y.M.C.A. of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia, 139 Pa. Super 332, 25 A.2d 406 (1939).
In this case a distinction was made between the property of an institution and the
activities of such. The court held that the institution was exempt from a service tax
as being a semipublic institution. This case also held that the 1933 General County
Assessment Law referred to real property. Our case implicitly overrules this interpreta-
tion given by that court as to the boundaries of the General County Assessment Law.
1. Commonwealth v. Johnson, 438 Pa. 485, 263 A.2d 376 (1970).
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simple. The defendant Johnston shot and killed a man named Pittman
while Pittman was on defendant's business premises as a social guest.
It appears the victim became embroiled with another guest in an
argument which led to a scuffle. The defendant Johnston requested the
victim to leave and escorted him to a car. The victim, however, did not
leave, but got out of his car and chased the contentious guest into a
building located on the premises.
The defendant, seeing the chase, attempted to prevent the victim
from entering the building, but he was unsuccessful. Johnston then
went to his own car, secured a pistol, and followed the victim into the
building. Once in the building, defendant Johnston again ordered
Pittman to leave, but the victim would not do so. Instead, Pittman
advanced on Johnson, telling the defendant to get out of the way. The
victim had a knife in his uplifted hand. Ignoring the defendant's
warning shot, Pittman continued to advance, whereupon the defendant
shot him at a range of six feet.
Before firing the fatal shots, the defendant could have used an open
passageway to escape. In its opinion, the court assumed the retreat was
safe.
Accordingly, the problem before the court was to decide whether,
in these circumstances of extreme and deadly peril to the person at-
tacked, a plea of self-defense to a charge of murder of the aggressor
could be legally interposed by the person attacked. The court con-
cluded that the defendant was not required to use a means of escape
open to him, but could stand his ground, and kill his assailant. What
makes this decision novel is the fact that it allows one to stand his
ground when in his place of business or office, and ward off an aggressor,
rather than "retreating to the wall."
It is essential, as hereinafter outlined, that the situation facing the
person attacked, be one involving a present, imminent and deadly peril
to his life. If the factual background is non-deadly in the sense that it
does not place the life of the person attacked in jeopardy, the rationale
of the subject case does not apply.
As a practical consideration, it is important to bear in mind that
the 20th century has introduced a multitude of deadly weapons, most
if not all of which are available as an arsenal to the criminally disposed.
Many of these are operative at long range, making attempts at escape
by a prospective victim, highly speculative and totally ineffectual. In
postulating rules and prescribing limitations upon what a person sub-
314
Vol. 9: 313, 1970-1971
Recent Decisions
ject to attack should or should not do in a given situation, every jurist
is mindful of a margin for error whose resolution may well forfeit the
life of one who is scrupulously adhering to the principle of self-defense.
This realization is posed as a caveat to what follows.
Self-defense is a negatively phrased expression. It connotes a counter-
aggression or counter-attack by one person upon another with such
maneuver resulting fatally for that other.
The court in previously adjudicated homicide cases, has never ex-
tolled self-defense as heroic.2 Certainly our Judeo-Christian emphasis
upon peace and a "turning of the other cheek" discouraged the use of
force, substituting flight for pursuit,3 and restraint for retaliation in
situations4 involving physical confrontations.
Under the influence of this philosophy Pennsylvania case law states
that one must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that his action
in taking another's life, arises by necessity.5
The following are the elements of self-defense in homicide. First, the
slayer must have been free from fault in provoking or continuing the
incident which ended in the killing.6 Conversely, if the slayer is at
fault, as, for example, where he commits a robbery, he loses the legal
right to defend himself.7 Second, the slayer must have a reasonable
apprehension of loss of his life, or of great bodily harm, so imminent
at the moment of assault as to present no alternative of escaping the con-
sequences except by resistance.' The test here is subjective, as well as
objective, it being sufficient if the slayer, in good faith, has a reasonable
belief of imminent peril from the facts as they appear to him at the
2. Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 22 (1868). The court stated: "When it comes
to a question whether one man shall flee or another shall die, the law decides that the
former shall rather flee than the latter shall die."
3. Id. at 20. The court discussed the concept of retreat and said: "To excuse homicide
by the plea of self-defense, it must appear that the slayer had no other possible, or
at least probable, means of escaping, and that his act was one of necessity."
4. Id. In attempting to balance restraint and retaliation the court described a hypo-
thetical situation in this way "If there be nothing in the circumstances indicating to
the slayer at the time of his act that his assailant is about to take his life, or do him
great bodily harm, but his object appears to be only to commit an ordinary assault and
battery, it will not excuse a man of equal strength, in taking his assailant's life with
a deadly weapon."
5. Commonwealth v. Nobel, 371 Pa. 138, 88 A.2d 760 (1952). Self-defense is an affirma-
tive defense which must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence.
6. Commonwealth v. Minoff, 363 Pa. 287, 69 A.2d 145 (1949).
7. Commonwealth v. Foster, 364 Pa. 288, 72 A.2d 279 (1950). In this case the court
charged that "any person in the barroom" where the robbery occurred, whether "per-
sonally attacked or not, would have a right" to kill the robber or robbers.
8. Logue v. Commonwealth, 58 Pa. 265, 268 (1861). When discussing the principle
of reasonable apprehension the court laid down the rule, "The law of self-defense is
a law of necessity, and that necessity must be real, or bear all the semblance of reality,
and appear to admit no other alternative..
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time, even though it later appears that he was mistaken. 9 Third, the
slayer may use only such force to repel attack as is or reasonably ap-
pears to be necessary.' 0 Regardless of the provocations, the slayer can-
not justify the destruction of one who has been rendered helpless and
from whom there is no longer a present threat to life or serious bodily
harm. In such circumstances, the provocation may well eliminate
malice which is the necessary ingredient of murder, but retain the
specific intent to kill which constitutes voluntary manslaughter."
Fourth, the slayer man not take life while there are other means of
escape open to him .12
The concept of self-defense in Pennsylvania is to permit homicide
in severely restricted circumstances. The slayer acts at his peril. He
is required to prove affirmatively 13 and by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that he was not at fault. He has to believe reasonably that he
was in imminent peril of death or of serious bodily harm. He must
also prove that he exercised only such force as was necessary to avert
the danger facing him, and reasonably believed that he could not take
flight.
It is apparent the recited doctrine, particularly the part dealing with
the need to escape rather than resist attack, is in direct conflict with
the ancient and venerable tradition that a man's dwelling house is his
castle which he can defend against intrusion. Accordingly, there devel-
oped an early exception to the requirement that escape should be made
where peril existed. This exception held that a person, within his
own dwelling house, need not retreat or seek to escape, even though he
could do so without added danger, but, being without fault, could
resist an assault, even to the point of taking life if need be.'
4
9. Commonwealth v. Murray, 79 Pa. 311, 317 (1875). This court faced the problem
of mistake in one's belief of imminent peril and said "The law will not hold a man
to absolute correctness of judgment under such trying circumstances."
10. Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9 (1868).
11. Commonwealth v. Vassar, 370 Pa. 551, 88 A.2d 725 (1952); Commonwealth v. Moore,
398 Pa. 198, 202 n.2, 157 A.2d 65, 68 n.2 (1959). It is seen, therefore, that where there
is a non-malicious felonious killing with a specific intent either to kill or to seriously
injure, it is voluntary manslaughter."
12. Commonwealth v. Collazo, 407 Pa. 494, 501, 180, A.2d 903, 906 (1962). The defen-
dant was attacked by the victim in this case. Counsel for the defense argued no duty to
retreat. The court, (Musmanno, J.) answered the contention in this way: "The defendant's
counsel cites many cases from other jurisdictions where it is said that the rule about
the duty to 'retreat to the wall' has been relaxed. No matter what other jurisdictions
might say on this point, the value of human life in Pennsylvania has not been legally
reduced ...."
13. Commonwealth v. Drum, 58 Pa. 9, 20 (1868). The court held "(t)he burthen (sic)
lies on the prisoner, in such a case of proving there was an actual necessity for taking
life, or a seeming one so reasonably apparent . .. ."
14. Commonwealth v. King, 35 P.L.J. 127 (1887).
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In Commonwealth v. Fraser, Justice Chidsey quoted the modification
in this language:
"Upon the theory that a man's house is his castle, and that he
has a right to protect it and those within it from intrusion or attack,
the rule is practically universal that when a person is attacked in
his own dwelling he may stand at bay and turn on and kill his
assailant if this is apparently necessary to save his own life or to
protect himself from great bodily harm. This is the rule both at
common law and by statute in many states-a man in his own house
was treated as 'at the wall,' and could not by another's assault,
be put under any duty to flee therefrom. The fact that retreat can
be safely effected does not render it necessary for a man assaulted
in his dwelling, to retreat therefrom. The view has even been taken
that the right to kill without retreat exists as to one's home or place
of residence even though an immoral business is carried on there."'15
This case distinguishes an earlier one, Commonwealth v. Johnston,'6
where both the victim and the slayer lived in the same house and both
were members of the owner's family. In the Johnston case, the Penn-
sylvania Supreme Court in a per curiam opinion bluntly asserted that
where both parties have a right to be on the premises the ordinary rules
of self-defense apply and the "rights of a householder against a violent
intruder have no relevancy."'11
This was the posture of the law in Pennsylvania until the subject case
of this note was decided. Expressed in the vernacular, the command-
ment read: "Don't stand to fight if you can walk away; don't walk if
you can run."
The law of self-defense was like a snug fitting suit, tight and re-
strictive when worn in public and only a shade less binding without
the waist-coat in the privacy of the home.
In reviewing its previous emphasis on retreat the Pennsylvania
Supreme Court reached the conclusion that a slayer was not required
to use a means of escape open to him while in his place of business, but
could stand his ground, being otherwise without fault, and kill his
assailant.
Although the invitees to the slayer's place of business were social
guests, not business customers, and the analogy to a man's dwelling
house might have been stressed, thereby, at least, tacitly preserving the
317
15. 369 Pa. 273, 276, 85 A.2d 126, 127 (1952).
16. Commonwealth v. Johnston, 213 Pa. 432, 62 A.1064 (1906).
17. Id. at 434, 62 A. at 1065.
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existing rule, Justice Eagen squarely supported a quotation from Amer-
ican Jurisprudence 2d,18 holding a person to be, in the words of that
publication," 'no more under the necessity of retreating than he would
be in his own home or dwelling.' "19
It is noteworthy that the victim's intent appeared to be to attack the
female guest, not the slayer, thereby clouding the issue by making it
uncertain whether a present, imminent threat to the slayer's life existed.
Moreover, Justice Eagen does not discuss the disparity of weapons,
it being self-evident that a 45 calibre automatic pistol is far more
devastating than a knife-in-hand, and, for that matter, quite capable
of disabling the assailant without the need of taking his life.
In a dissenting opinion, joined in by Justice Jones, Justice Pomeroy
reiterates the rule of Commonwealth v. Drum without direct reference
to that case, asserting "I would not adopt a rule of law which more
easily justified the taking of human life." He continued:
"I believe that significant definitional problems are inherent in the
majority's rule and indicate the unwisdom of the court's present
holding. What is one's home, and where it is, is generally a simple
matter of fact, and not a matter of dispute. One's 'office or place of
business', on the other hand, is not so susceptible to each defini-
tion; and the collateral determination of the person, or the class of
persons, able to claim the 'place of business' exception will prove
still more elusive. It is easy to imagine the troublesome problems
which may arise when the courts of this Commonwealth attempt to
apply this no-retreat rule to a street comer newsstand, a small store
or a large one, an office building, a factory, a mine or a farm, to
suggest a few examples. Precisely because the present rules relating
to self-defense are adequate, these problems are unnecessarily cre-
ated." 20
It is submitted the dissenting opinion echoes an earlier generation
in which the value of human life was more emphasized than now and
that the subject decision appears to encourage additional violence by
extending the area wherein justifiable homicide exists. No doubt the
majority felt compelled to meet the rising tide of violent destruction of
business properties and the feloneous killing of merchants owning
them, by removing the restraining need to seek escape before retaliat-
ing in kind. It illustrates the adage that force begets force. Whether
18. 40 AM. JuR. 2d Homicide, § 169 (1968).
19. 438 Pa. 485, 491, 263 A.2d 376, 380 (1970).
20. Id. at 493, 263 A.2d at 381.
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society will profit from the business-place extension of self-defense is
a matter of speculation.
There is little doubt, however, that there will be serious definitional
problems in the application of the business-place revision, for, unlike
"dwelling house," which has for centuries had a distinct and legal
meaning, "place of business" has none. The American Jurisprudence
2d definition21 speaks of a man's "occupancy of such office or place of
business," in referring to the place from which he need no longer re-
treat.
. It is submitted this terminology has no legal, in fact, scarcely a lay
significance.2 2 Conceivably, a man's place of business may well be any-
where he engages in a gainful pursuit whether as employer, employee,
independent contractor, or volunteer, thereby making his right not to
retreat more predominant in area than the space where he is obliged
to flee.
Further, wherein does a man's occupancy of any other place differ
legally from occupying his office or place of business insofar as his
privilege to be secure from unwarranted aggression is concerned? If he
is lawfully at a social gathering, at the opera or theatre, a swimming
pool, the country club, or in church, wherein do any of these have less
stature or "face" than his office or place of business?
It is submitted that in varying degree any one aspect of man's social
activities might well be deemed by the individual concerned, to be of
more import than the occupying of his place of business, and that in
extending the latitude of "no retreat", the Pennsylvania court has ac-
cented the superficial trappings of life at the expense of life itself.
Without intending to moralize, it is suggested that there is an un-
commonly wide difference between the traditions associated with the
home and the worldly surroundings of the corner bookie shop, the
downstairs poolroom, and even the neighborhood family tavern. To say
the proprietor of any of the three "business places" is "already at the
wall" and need not retreat when a customer seeks to attack him, and
from whom a safe retreat could be made without danger (just as if he
21. 40 AM. JUR., supra note 18.
22. 1 FUNK & WAGNALL'S STANDARD DICTONARY, 180 (Britannica ed. -) lists these
synonyms for business; "Art, avocation, barter, calling, commerce, concern, craft, duty,
employment, handicraft, industry, job, labor, occupation, profession, trade, trading, traffic,
vocation and work."
In BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1363 (3rd. ed. 1933), the following appears "'Place' This
word is a very indefinite term. It is applied to any location limited by boundaries, how-
ever large or small."
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were to be attacked in his own home),-even to the point of killing
the aggressor, is to put the imprimatur of civility upon an uncivilized
act. If the law will justify the taking of life in the recited circumstances,
what legal or moral restraint can logically distinguish aggression in any
other situation where the choice lies between escape or homicide?
Has the Pennsylvania court re-established the law of the frontier and
the days of the old west?
It is not a facile matter to distinguish the "retreat" and "no retreat"
areas, and a herculean task to define them. Logic would appear to
justify the conclusion that for all practical purposes, the future23 use
of self-defense will not require the accused to flee aggression in Penn-
sylvania homicide cases. To borrow an old phrase: "The exception has
now become the rule."
J. Kerry Lewis
CRIMINAL LAW-THE PRESUMPTION OF SANITY-BURDEN OF PROVING
SANITY OR INSANITY-The Pennsylvania Supreme Court has held that
insanity is a defense to murder, but was unable to come to any agree-
ment as to the effect of the presumption of sanity, and the burden of
proving sanity or insanity.
Commonwealth v. Vogel, 440 Pa. 1, 268 A.2d 89 (1970).
The defendant, Dennis Vogel, shot and killed two persons while carry-
ing out an armed robbery. At his trial, he pleaded not guilty by reason
of insanity. The defense presented four eminent psychiatrists to estab-
lish Vogel's legal insanity in accordance with the M'Naghten rule. The
commonwealth offered no testimony to rebutt or impeach the testi-
23. The MODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 (1962) set forth the following standard:
(b) The use of deadly force is not justifiable under this section unless the actor
believes that such force is necessary to protect himself against death, serious bodily
harm, kidnapping or sexual intercourse compelled by force or threat;
(1) The actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or place of work, unless
he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work by another person
whose place of work the actor knows it to be. ...
The Proposed Crimes Code for Pennsylvania Which was submitted by the Joint State
Goverment to the Pennsylvania General Assembly in 1967, uses precisely the same lan-
guage in Section 304(b)(2)(ii)(a) Use of Force in Sell-Protection.
It will be noted that the subject case has extended the proposed area of retreat by
substituting "place of business" for "place of work", and by elimination of the specific
qualifying conditions dealing with retreat.
Query: Is the court more sensitive to the public's need than the peoples' elected rep-
resentatives?
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